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hands of one man, even the President, is very close to governmental censorship of the news and may well be an unconstitutional
limitation on the freedoms of speech and press.
On the other hand, the present state of our relations with
Cuba is so delicate that it may be in the national interest that such
a restriction be sustained, especially since provision is made for at
least a few exceptions and is, hopefully, a temporary measure.

A
CRIMINAL LAW VOLUNTARINESS OF A

NEW

YORK

PROCEDURE

TO

DETERMINE

Petitioner
was convicted of murder in the first degree in a trial during
which the judge submitted to the same jury both the questions
of guilt and the voluntariness of his confession in accordance with
New York procedure. The conviction was affirmed by the New
York Court of Appeals and thereafter Jackson filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the federal district court, alleging the unconstitutionality of the New York procedure. After both the district
court and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the
New York procedure violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by denying defendant's right to a fair and
separate determination of the voluntariness of his confession.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Under common law a confession, when "not the product of
any meaningful act of volition" I on the part of the accused, was
held inadmissible as evidence in criminal trials since there was a
CONFESSION

judicial belief in its probable falsity. 2

RULED

INVALID.

-

This rule of evidence, some-

times enacted into state law,3 caused some state courts to exclude
coerced confessions without relying on the constitutional principles
of due process of law.
Although the passage of the fourteenth amendment in 1868
applied the concept of due process to the states, no case involving
a state conviction based on an allegedly involuntary confession
reached the United States Supreme Court until 1936 in Brozwn
China. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1959, p. 29, col. 1. It would seem that since
Mr. Worthy was not among these representatives his travel to Cuba would
be "unsafe."
I Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 211 (1960).
23 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
s See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 395; TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art
727 (1907).
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v. Mississippi.4 In Brown, the uncontradicted evidence established
that defendants, two Negroes, had been convicted of first degree
murder solely on the basis of confessions obtained after severe
beatings by police officers. The state court conviction was so
clearly violative of our "'fundamental principles of liberty and
justice' "" that the Court unanimously reversed, without discussing
the nature of coerced confessions. 6 While Browm and similar
decisions 7 have been interpreted as relying on the old commonlaw reasoning behind exclusion, i.e., the untrustworthiness of the
confession as evidence,8 such a conclusion is not apparent from
the decisions themselves. The Court's position was soon clarified
when in 1941 it declared that "the aim of the requirement of
due process is not to exclude presumptively- false evidence, but
to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether
true or false." 9 Thus the Court rejected the common-law reason
for exclusion and applied as its new standard the "fundamental
unfairness" test.
The Court, in applying this test, developed two approaches:
the subjective approach,' 0 in which the Court studied the conditions
surrounding the confession in light of the accused's age, education,
intelligence and other personal factors, to determine whether his
mind had in fact been overcome; and the objective approach,"
which was applied when the conditions under which the confession was made were so inherently coercive that involuntariness
could be found as a matter of law.
In deciding whether there was coercion under either approach,
the Court either reached its conclusion on a case presenting undisputed facts, or would look into the entire record if the facts
were disputed.' 2 If it found sufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that the confession was not involuntary, the conviction
was affirmed. It should be noted, however, that this was not
an affirmative finding that the confession was voluntary, but merely
judicial recognition that the lower court finding was supported
by the record. On the other hand, a finding that the confession
was involuntary automatically meant a reversal, regardless of
whether other evidence existed which was sufficient to convict.
The Court necessarily presumed that the jury had relied upon
4297 U.S. 278 (1936).
5Id. at 286.
6See also Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
7 Chambers v. Florida, supra note 6; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629
(1940).
S Ritz, Twenty-five Years Of State Criminal Confession Cases In The

U.S. 9 Supreme Court, 19 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 35, 43-44 (1962).
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
'oBlackbrmn v. Alabama, supra note 1, at 208.
x1
Ashcraft v. Tennessee 322 U.S. 143 (1944).

'2 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1957).
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the confession in reaching its verdict, although, in fact, it had no
way of knowing this with certainty.
Until the case of Stein v. New York Is the Court had dealt
with its usual determination of the voluntariness of a confession.
In Stein, for the first time, the issue of whether the trial court
procedurefor deciding voluntariness was consistent with due process
was raised. The New York procedure in question provided that
the judge, if so requested, would hold a preliminary hearing on
the coercion issue and would, as a matter of law, exclude the
confession if in no circumstances it could be deemed voluntary.
If, however, he would find a fair question as to its voluntariness,
he would be required to submit the question to the jury. The
jury would then be instructed to disregard the confession if it
found coercion, but to consider the confession's weight or degree
of veracity in reaching a verdict if it were deemed voluntary.
The basis for this procedure was the principle that questions
of law must be decided by the judge, and questions of fact are
reserved for the jury.14
Other jurisdictions 15 apply the so-called "orthodox" or "Wigmore" rule, whereby the judge makes the final determination as
to voluntariness in all cases since the problem is viewed as basically
one of admissibility. 6 A third procedure, popularly called the
"Massachusetts" rule,17 provides that the judge is to determine
whether the confession is voluntary or coerced. If voluntary, he
admits it together with an instruction that the jury must also
find it voluntary before it may be considered as evidence of guilt.
Still other procedures exist in some jurisdictions which are basically
variations or combinations of the three rules discussed above.'
Although prior to Stein the various procedural rules were
never tested in the Supreme Court, the "orthodox" rule was
accepted without question and the other two were thought to have
been sanctioned in the case of Wilson v. United States.19 In
Stein, petitioners had requested the judge to instruct the jury that
if the confessions were deemed by them to be involuntary, they
were required to return a verdict of acquittal. The petitioners,
on appeal, alleged that the trial judge's refusal to instruct the
jury as requested was a violation of their constitutional rights
13346 U.S. 156 (1953).

24People
v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927).
' 5 E.g., Connecticut, Illinois, Florida, Virginia.
16 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 861.
- Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 277, 5 N.E. 494, 495 (1885).
2sFBor the purposes of this article the variations will not be discussed.
The statement relied upon is: "When there
'9 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896).
is a conflict of evidence as to whether a confession is or is not voluntary,
if the court decides that it is admissible, the question may be left to the jury
with the direction that they should reject the confession if upon the whole
evidence they are satisfied it was not the voluntary act of the defendant."
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based on due process.&2 The Court found the requested instruction
too far-reaching since the jury under New York procedure might
properly convict on other evidence, even though it rejects the
confession as involuntary. There was, however, no way of knowing
whether this had occurred in Stein, since only a general verdict
had been rendered. Thus, the Court found it necessary to review
the entire record to determine whether there existed sufficient
evidence, exclusive of the confession, to support a conviction.
Upon analysis, the Court found not only that ample evidence existed
to convict without the confession, but that the circumstances
surrounding the confession itself would justify a finding that it
was voluntary. Having given such close scrutiny to the mechanics
of the New York procedure, and having affirmed the convictions,
the Court sanctioned the New York rule of admissibility.
However, Stein contained the seeds of its own future rejection
by the Court since Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority,
conceded that a jury might confuse the issue of voluntariness with
21
the issue of guilt.

The Court's reasoning that even if the

admitted confession were coerced, ample evidence existed to sustain the conviction, was apparently a departure from the procedure
followed by previous cases wherein it was held that the admission
of a coerced confession vitiated the trial.22 Authorities commenting
on Stein rationalized the Supreme Court's view by theorizing
that the jury's rejection of a coerced confession that had been
23
admitted gives it the same status as a confession never admitted
since in both cases the confession was not being used to convict.
An important indication that Stein's apparent approval of the
New York procedure would be short-lived came in the case of
Rogers v. Richmond 24 in 1961. In that case the Connecticut
courts, in applying the "Wigmore" rule, considered the reliability
20The authority chiefly relied upon was Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 404 (1945), where the Court stated: "And if it is introduced at the
trial, the judgment of conviction will be set aside even though the evidence
apart from the confession might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's
verdict."
21 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1953).
"Perhaps a more
serious, practical cause of dissatisfaction is the absence of any assurance that
the confessions did not serve as makeweights in a compromise verdict, some
jurors accepting the confessions to overcome lingering doubt of guilt, others
rejecting them but finding their doubts satisfied by other evidence, and yet
others or perhaps all never reaching a separate and definite conclusion as to
the confession but returning an unanalytical and impressionistic verdict based
on 22
all they had heard."

E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, supra note 12, at 568; Gallegos v. Nebraska,
342 U.S. 55, 63 (1951).
23Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility
Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHi. L. REv. 317, 346 (1954); Scott, State
Criminal Procedure, The Fourteenth Amendment and Prejudice, 49 Nw. U.L.
REv. 319, 320 (1954).
24365 U.S. 534 (1961).
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of the allegedly coerced confession in determining its voluntariness.
The Supreme Court expressly noted the violation of due process
rights when the question of voluntariness was allowed
to enter
25
into the determination of guilt by either judge or jury.
The clarification of the Court's views on the admissibility of
coerced confessions, made necessary by the ambiguities of Stein,
was attempted by the Court in Jackson v. Denno.2 6 The New
York procedure was held to violate due process by depriving a
defendant of his right to a reliable determination of the voluntariness of his confession, uninfluenced by its probable truth or falsity.
The Court based its reasoning on the psychological impossibility,
inherent in the New York procedure, for a jury to make a clearly
separate judgment as to guilt or innocence when the question of
coercion was simultaneously submitted to it. The jurors first hear
all the evidence relating to both the voluntariness of the confession
and other indications of guilt, and are then instructed to forget
all they heard about the confession if they find it involuntary.
Thus, the Court concluded, evidence concerning the confession
cannot be entirely erased from the jurors' minds, so that a confession rejected as involuntary may subconsciously influence them
in finding the defendant guilty. On the other hand, should the
jury find the confession -voluntary, and rely upon it, there is no
assurance to a reviewing court that the finding of voluntariness
was not prompted by a belief in the defendant's guilt, based upon
other evidence. Thus the constitutional rule set forth in Rogers,
that a defendant is entitled to a determination of the voluntariness
of the confession without reference to its truth, is inherently
violated in the practical application of the New York procedure.
Stein, which had presumed the jury's ability to follow the instructions explicitly, was therefore overruled.
The basic premise of the majority opinion, the jury's inability to perform the mental gymnastics required by the New York
procedure, appears to be countered by the dissent of Mr. justice
Harlan, joined by Justices Clark and Stewart. The dissent cites
two previous Supreme Court decisions 27 in which juries were
given instructions even more complicated and demanding than
those in Jackson. Both cases strongly upheld the ability of juries
to make fine distinctions, for to hold otherwise would be to weaken
belief in the jury system itself. The dissent also noted that while
the majority continues to sanction the "Massachusetts" procedure,
there is no realistic difference between it and the New York
rule. In Massachusetts, the judge's determination is final only
25

1Id. at 545 n.3.
28378 U.S. 368 (1964).
27 Delli

Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957) ; Leland v. Oregon, 343

U.S. 790 (1952).
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if he deems the confession involuntary. Therefore, if the judge
has a doubt as to voluntariness, he is likely to resolve that doubt
by admitting the confession and allowing the jury to have thi
final say on the question.28 Accordingly, the "Massachusetts" procedure provides that the judge instruct the jury that it must also
find the confession voluntary before it may be considered as a
factor in the determination of guilt. This situation is quite similar
to a court's tentative submission to the jury of a doubtful confession, a procedure condemned in the instant case. The result
is a grave doubt as to the justification of prohibiting one procedure and sanctioning the other.
In addition, the dissent noted that state criminal procedures
should be interfered with only when they infringe upon "rights
fundamental to decent society" and the New York procedure was
not of such a character. Mention was also made of the confusion
that could result if Jackson were to be applied retroactively, and
of the difficulty of attaining state compliance with constitutional
standards when the Court makes such sudden and drastic changes
in its interpretation of due process.
In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice Black noted that the
commentators,2 9 on whom the majority had relied so heavily, had
advanced no "factual data" to support their claim that the New
York procedure is unfair to the accused. He opposed the rejection, on the basis of mere "theoretical contemplation," of a
procedure of such wide-spread and long-continued use.
In basing its rationale on the inability of a jury to follow
the instructions required by the New York procedure, the Court
may have revealed, as the dissent seems to fear, a basic lack of
confidence in the jury system itself. This distrust could extend
to other situations in which two or more issues, one of which is
dependent upon another, are submitted to a jury for a general
verdict. If so, the procedures by which juries determine guilt along
with other dependent issues, for example, insanity, 30 could also be
questioned. Likewise, any finding by a jury that had been given
difficult or complicated instructions could become suspect. It
remains to be seen whether the Court will extend its apparent
distrust of the jury to other situations or confine it to the procedure
questioned in the instant case.
As a result of the decision in Jackson, the New York courts
are left without a procedure for dealing with allegedly coerced
confessions. To fill the vacuum, New York must adopt a rule
2

8 Meltzer, supra note 23, at 329.
Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility
Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. Cii. L. REv. 317 (1954) ; Morgan, Functions
29

of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact,
43 Hav. L. REv. 165 (1929).
8o People v. Carpenter, 102 N.Y. 238, 242, 6 N.E. 584, 585 (1886).
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which will conform to the constitutional standards' set forth in
.the instant case. One possible replacement is the "Massachusetts"
procedure, but in view of the standard announced in Jackson,
it is a questionable choice. That procedure would appear to
subject the accused to the same danger which the Court found
in the New York rule, viz., the possible confusion of issues by a
jury which must consider both the voluntariness of a confession
and the guilt of a defendant. The fact that the judge in the
"Massachusetts" procedure has made the initial determination does
not alter the fact that the final, and perhaps vital determination,
is made by the same jury that decides guilt.
Even the use of the "Wigmore" procedure does not preclude
the possibility of the confusion of the voluntariness and truth of a
confession. This was seen in Rogers,32 where the judge, in his instructions to the jury, revealed that he himself had considered the
reliability of the confession in reaching his decision to admit it as
voluntary. The capacity for error, which, in the words of Mr. Justice
Black, is "inherent in any confession fact-finding by human factfinders," 33 is present in judges as well as in jurors.
Since both of the existing alternatives to the rejected rule
are in some way defective, New York may well seek a third
procedure. The courts of that state have traditionally held that
voluntariness is a question of fact and must therefore be submitted
to a jury.3 4 It is suggested, therefore, that in its search for a
new procedure, New York should consider a system whereby a
confession presenting a fair question as to its voluntariness would
be submitted to a jury for a determination of that issue alone.
If held involuntary, the confession would be excluded from evidence
in the later trial, where a different jury would determine guilt.
If, on the other hand, the confession were found voluntary, then
perhaps the jury could be retained and presented with the evidence
of guilt. Such a system would appear to comply with both the
constitutional standard of separate determination required by Jackson, and with the view traditionally held in New York that voluntariness is a question of fact for the jury.

31

"These procedures must, therefore, be fully adequate to insure a reliable
and clear cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession, including
the resolution of disputed facts upon which the voluntariness issue may
depend," Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391 (1964). The Court also
stated that the defendant has a constitutional right "to have a fair hearing
and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a determination
uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession." Id. at 377.
32 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).

3 Jackson v. Denno, supra note 31, at 402 (separate opinion).
34N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 419; People v. Doran, supra note 14.

